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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all 
named parties in the proceedings in the district court. However, 
at trial in this matter W. Kevin Jackson, Esq., of Jensen, Duffin, 
Carman, Dibb & Jackson entered an appearance on behalf of "the Baum 
child" (the defendant) and his father, Douglas H. Baum, and Gary L. 
Johnson, Esq., of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson entered an 
appearance on behalf of United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company, which issued an insurance policy to the defendant's 
father. See Record at 237. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code, 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under the facts of this case, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to set aside the 
default and default judgment entered against him? 
Standard of Review; A trial court has broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, and its 
decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of 
discretion is "clearly established." Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. 
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973) . See also Russell 
v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); Board of Educ. of 
Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 807 
(1963) (an appellate court will disturb the trial court's 
discretion only if there is "a patent abuse thereof"). On review 
of a trial court's order denying a motion to set aside a default 
judgment, the facts are viewed in the strongest light in favor of 
the trial court's decision. Goqlia v. Bodnar. 749 P.2d 921, 929 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
determinative of the issue on appeal. The rule is reproduced in 
the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries the 
plaintiff suffered as a result of a one-car accident. The 
plaintiff was a passenger in the car, and the defendant was the 
driver. Record ("R.") at 2-3. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
The plaintiff filed this action in Third District Court on 
January 31, 1992. R. at 2-3. The defendant was personally served 
with process on February 11, 1992. The defendant failed to answer, 
and his default was entered on May 18, 1992. Id. at 9. 
On June 16, 1992, the case was tried to the court on the issue 
of damages, Id. at 2 34-313, and a judgment in the amount of 
$5,623,839 was entered against the defendant on June 17, 1992, id. 
at 17-18. 
On September 11, 1992, the defendant filed a motion to set 
aside the default and default judgment. Id. at 169. The court 
denied the motion and entered an order to that effect on October 
19, 1992. Id. at 207-08. On October 21, 1992, the defendant filed 
an objection to the proposed order denying his motion to set aside 
the default judgment. Id. at 210-11. On December 1, 1992, the 
court entered an order denying the defendant's objection and 
providing that its prior order denying the defendant's motion to 
set aside the default and default judgment would be deemed entered 
as of December 1, 1992. Id. at 218. On December 21, 1992, the 
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defendant appealed the order denying his motion to set aside the 
default and default judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals. Id. at 
221. The court of appeals determined that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. Id. 
at 227-28. On March 24, 1993, the supreme court assigned the case 
to the court of appeals. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On June 1, 1991, the plaintiff, Toby Slingerland, and the 
defendant, Douglas Baum, were returning from Wendover to Salt Lake 
City in Baum's car. R. at 256. Baum was driving, and Slingerland, 
his passenger, was asleep. Id. Baum fell asleep at the wheel, the 
car rolled, and Slingerland was left a quadriplegic as a result of 
the accident. Id. at 2 f 4 & 176 f 2, 
Shortly after the accident, Baum notified United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company ("USF&G") of the accident 
and requested coverage. Id. at 177 f 3. USF&G told him that it 
would not cover the accident. Id. f 4. 
Slingerland filed this action on January 31, 1992, to recover 
for the injuries he sustained as a result of Baum's negligence. 
Id. at 2-3. Baum was duly served with a summons and complaint on 
February 11, 1992. Id. at 5-7. 
Baum discussed the lawsuit with an attorney, who advised him 
that liability was almost certain and that "probably [his] best 
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option would be to eventually file for bankruptcy." Id. at 177 f 
9. 
Baum did not file an answer, and on May 18, 1992, his default 
was entered. Id. at 9. 
That same day, the judge assigned to the case informed 
Slingerland's attorney that she was acquainted with Slingerland's 
aunt and would recuse herself if the parties felt it was necessary. 
Id. at 8. The court ordered Slingerland's attorney to contact the 
defendant and inform him of the court's position, which he did by 
a letter dated May 19, 1992. See id. at 8 & 10. Counsel also 
notified Baum of the scheduled trial date. Id. at 10. Baum did 
not respond to this letter, but the trial judge, on her own motion, 
recused herself, and the case was reassigned. Id. at 11 & 12. 
A trial on the issue of damages was held on June 16, 1992. 
See id. at 2 34. At the trial, David R. Olsen appeared on behalf of 
the plaintiff, Slingerland. The court also noted the appearances 
of Gary L. Johnson representing USF&G and Kevin Jackson, who stated 
he was representing "the father, the Baum child, the insurance 
policy in question." Id. at 237; see also id. at 235. Mr. Johnson 
and Mr. Jackson indicated that they were there to "monitor" the 
proceedings. The court invited them to participate in the 
proceedings: 
If either of you had any interest in respect to your 
respective clients in terms of examining or questioning 
any of the evidence that might be presented before the 
court I would like to hear that. I'm not inviting major 
contest, if that's not appropriate. You know your case 
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better than I do, but at the same time if there were to 
be information that could help me evaluate this better it 
would be appreciated. 
Id. at 238. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Jackson acknowledged the court's 
invitation, id. , but declined to ask any questions of the witnesses 
or make any other comments. 
At the close of the evidence, the court repeated its offer to 
let counsel make any inquiries of witnesses or any comments they 
wished to make. Id. at 307. Again, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Jackson 
declined. Jd. The court then made its ruling on damages, and a 
judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Slingerland and against Mr. 
Baum as follows: 
Special damages: $4,623,839 
General damages: $1,000.000 
Total damages: $5,623,839 
Id. at 17-18. 
On July 9, 1992, USF&G filed an action against Baum, his 
father and Slingerland in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no 
duty to defend against or provide coverage for Slingerland's 
claims. See id. at 188; Appellant's Brief at 4 J 10. 
On August 18, 1992, the Baums filed a counterclaim against 
USF&G in the declaratory judgment action alleging that USF&G had 
acted in bad faith in refusing to settle Slingerland's claims for 
the $100,000 policy limit. See R. at 188 I 7. 
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After the Baums counterclaimed for bad faith, USF&G retained 
new counsel to represent Baum. Appellant's Brief at 4 J 11 & 13. 
On September 11, 1992, almost three months after the judgment was 
entered, the new counsel USF&G had retained for Baum filed a motion 
to set aside the default and default judgment. R. at 169. The 
court denied Baum's motion to set aside the default and default 
judgment, id. at 208 & 218-19, and this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court had considerable discretion under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) in ruling on Baum's motion to set aside the 
default judgment entered against him. Before Baum could have the 
judgment set aside, he had to clearly establish (1) that the 
judgment was entered as a result of mistake, inadvertence or 
excusable neglect, (2) that his motion to set aside the judgment 
was timely, (3) that he had a meritorious defense to Slingerland's 
claim, and (4) that Slingerland would not be prejudiced if the 
judgment were set aside. 
None of the factors Baum relied on constituted mistake, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect within the meaning of rule 60(b) . 
Thus, Baum did not meet his burden of showing a sufficient excuse 
for his default. In fact, Baum's own testimony clearly established 
that the default judgment entered against him was the result of his 
own deliberate decision to suffer a default judgment rather than 
incur the costs of defending this action. That decision was made 
only after he had consulted with counsel of his choice. Rule 60(b) 
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does not authorize the court to grant relief from poor tactical 
decisions. See Point I. 
The trial court therefore did not have to reach the issues of 
timeliness, meritorious defense and prejudice. Nevertheless, Baum 
did not meet his burden of showing that his motion was timely, see 
point II; that his alleged defenses would have led to a different 
result, see point III; or that Slingerland would not be prejudiced 
if the judgment were set aside, see point IV, 
Thus, under the facts of this case, "the lower court did not 
err [in refusing to set aside the default judgment], but . . . 
[Baum] did by urging too little too late." See Heath v. Heath, 541 
P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1975). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BAUM DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING SUFFICIENT GROUNDS 
TO JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND JUDGMENT, 
Baum argues that default judgments are generally disfavored 
because they run counter to the policy favoring resolution of 
disputes on their merits. However, Utah courts have consistently 
rejected the argument that that policy alone justifies setting 
aside a default judgment. See, e.g. , State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 
1053, 1055 (Utah 1983); Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 
1979); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429, 431 (1973); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 123 Utah 416, 260 
P.2d 741, 742-44 (1953). That is because there are equally strong 
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countervailing policies, such as "the strong policy favoring the 
finality of judgments." See Kulchar v. Kulchar, 462 P.2d 17, 19 
(Cal. 1969) (Traynor, C.J.)* "Obviously, the [plaintiffs] 
interest[s] must also be protected . . . ." Larsen v. Collina. 684 
P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984) ; see also Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. . 
589 P.2d 767, 768 (Utah 1978). 
A rule which would permit the re-opening of cases 
previously decided because of error or ignorance during 
the progress of the trial would in a large measure 
vitiate the effects of res judicata and create a hardship 
to the successful litigant in causing him to prosecute 
his action more than once and possibly lose the ability 
to collect his judgment . . . . 
Warren, 260 P.2d at 743. 
The "more pertinent" public policies in a case such as this 
are those found in the rules of civil procedure governing the time 
for answering a complaint and the setting aside of judgments. Cf. 
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 
1987) . "Public policy requires that pressure be brought upon 
litigants to use great care in preparing cases for trial and in 
ascertaining all the facts." Kulchar, 462 P.2d at 19 (quoting 
Restatement of Judgments § 126 comment a). The rules of procedure 
"are positive in their application and are designed to expedite 
litigation." Warren, 260 P.2d at 744. They give the parties an 
opportunity to have their case tried on the merits, but a party 
does not have to take advantage of that opportunity. If the 
requirements of the rules of civil procedure are met, a judgment 
will not be set aside "merely because the particular individual 
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against whom it was rendered did not in fact have an opportunity to 
present his claim or defense." Id. at 743. 
If a default judgment could be set aside merely because the 
defendant, who had notice of the action and an opportunity to 
appear and defend, had not been heard on the merits, the rules of 
civil procedure would be nullified and our system of justice 
undermined• See Warren, 260 P.2d at 743-44. Thus, this court has 
held that "the requirements of public policy demand more than a 
mere statement that a person did not have h: ** day in court when 
full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him . . . ." 
Id. at 744; Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 
513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973). Courts deny relief "if a party has 
been given notice of an action and has not been prevented from 
participating therein." Kulchar, 462 P.2d at 19. 
Whether or not a default judgment should be set aside depends 
on the "peculiar facts and circumstances" of the particular case. 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1979). The Utah Supreme 
Court has therefore committed the decision to grant or deny relief 
from judgments to the sound discretion of the trial court. The 
trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to 
set aside a default judgment, and an appellate court will reverse 
its ruling "only if it is clear the trial court abused its 
discretion." Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984) 
(emphasis added). Accord Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 
P.2d 573, 573-74 (1962). The rule that courts will generally 
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"incline towards" granting relief to a party who has not had an 
opportunity to be heard "is ordinarily applied at the trial court 
level," in the exercise of that court's broad discretion. Warren, 
260 P.2d at 744; Airkem, 513 P.2d at 431. The fact that the trial 
court could have granted a defaulting party an opportunity to be 
heard does not mean that the court abused its discretion in denying 
relief. Warren, 260 P.2d at 744. See also Katz v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) ("That some basis may exist to set aside 
the default does not require the conclusion that the court abused 
its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances 
support the refusal"). 
The cases Baum relies on for his policy argument "are 
predicated upon the hypothesis that there has been some mistake or 
excusable neglect on the part of the movant from which, in justice 
and equity, he should be relieved." Chrysler v. Chrysler. 5 Utah 
2d 415, 303 P.2d 995, 996 (1956). Thus, the "pertinent inquiry" is 
not whether Baum had his day in court but whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in concluding that Baum did not show 
sufficient justification for setting aside the default judgment. 
See Chrysler, 303 P.2d at 996. 
Motions to set aside default judgments are governed by Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which states: "On motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
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excusable neglect . . . ." Utah R. Civ, P. 60(b) (emphasis 
added).1 If the trial court could have concluded from the record 
that Baum's asserted justification for setting the judgment aside 
did not amount to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, then 
its order denying Baum relief from that judgment must be affirmed. 
See, e.g.f Warren, 260 P.2d at 744. See also Western Union Tel. 
Co. v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1939) ("It is an abuse 
of discretion . . . to open or vacate a judgment where the moving 
party shows no legal ground therefor or offers no excuse for his 
own negligence or default"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has generally found mistake, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect only where it appeared that the 
defendant may not have received proper notice, where the defendant 
was induced not to file an answer by the plaintiff or the court or 
where the defendant was prevented from doing so by circumstances 
beyond his control. See, e.g. , May v. Thompson. 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 
(Utah 1984) (the evidence was contradictory as to whether the 
defendant ever received the complaint); Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 63 6 
P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Utah 1981) (the plaintiff knew the defendant 
intended to defend, failed to provide requested information, and 
gave the impression that no default would be taken) . See also 
Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1983) (no abuse 
1
 Although rule 60(b) lists seven reasons for setting aside 
a judgment, Baum relies only on the first of these. He claims that 
the judgment should be set aside only for "mistake, inadvertence, 
or excusable neglect." See Appellant's Brief at 6. 
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of discretion to refuse to set aside a default judgment where 
defendant made no showing that he was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances beyond his control); Airkem. 513 P.2d at 431 
(defendant must show that he used due diligence and was prevented 
from appearing by circumstances beyond his control); Warren, 260 
P.2d at 742 (relief may be granted for procedural difficulties, the 
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the 
presentation of a claim or defense). 
Baum claims that, at the time the default was entered, he was 
a young man with no legal experience, he was suffering emotional 
distress from having been sued by his best friend and was in a 
state of confusion, partly as a result of his conversations with an 
attorney, who told him that he had little option but to declare 
bankruptcy, and with USF&G, which told him that he had no insurance 
coverage. As a result, he felt that his only option was to do 
nothing. Baum claims that his mistaken judgment and confused state 
of mind constitute "mistake" and "excusable neglect" within the 
meaning of rule 60(b) (1) . See Appellant's Brief at 8-9. Cf. R. at 
176-78. The trial court properly rejected these arguments. 
Baum's claims of youth and legal inexperience were 
insufficient to justify setting aside the judgment. There was no 
evidence of Baum's age at the time this action was filed. See R. 
at 176-78. Nevertheless, Baum admits that he was twenty-two years 
old at the time the default was entered, see Appellant's Brief at 
8; R. at 172, which is well past the age of majority and well past 
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the age for which a person becomes responsible for his actions. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-2-1 (1992) & 76-2-301 (1990). 
Moreover, Baum's actions belie his claim that he lacked 
sophistication in legal matters.2 He contacted his insurance 
company even before any action was filed, notifying it of the 
accident and requesting coverage. R. at 177 J 3. He also sought 
the advice of an attorney. Id. 5 9. And his family attorney 
appeared at the trial on damages. Id. at 237. 
In any event, Utah courts have rejected the argument that 
inexperience with the legal process is a sufficient reason to set 
aside a default judgment, especially where, as here, the defendant 
in fact discussed the matter with an attorney. See, e.g., J.P.W. 
Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1979). Accord 
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Yuil Int'l Trading Corp., 
105 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Bahr v. Pasky, 439 
A.2d 174, 175-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (inexperience with legal 
matters and illness do not justify setting aside a default 
judgment). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Baum's age and alleged lack of legal experience did 
not excuse his failure to answer Slingerland's complaint. 
Baum's claimed emotional distress and confusion did not 
justify relief from the judgment either. See, e.g., Smallridge v. 
2
 Baum's lack of legal experience stems from the fact that he 
had never been sued before. R. at 177 f 7. He cites no authority, 
however, for his proposed rule that every defendant is entitled to 
his first default. 
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Macalaster Bicknell Co. of N.Y., 522 N.Y.S.2d 52, 52 (App. Div. 
1987) (confusion and great personal stress were insufficient to 
justify default). "Illness alone is not sufficient to make neglect 
in defending one's action excusable." Warren, 260 P.2d at 743. In 
Warren. the defendant claimed that he had been seriously ill at the 
time he was served. The court stated: "We are not told the nature 
of the illness [but] it does not appear that [the defendant] was so 
incapacitated that he could not have called an attorney to have his 
rights . . . protected." 260 P.2d at 743. Here, Baum claims he 
was emotionally ill, not physically ill, as the defendant in Warren 
apparently claimed, but the distinction is irrelevant. Baum does 
not claim that his emotional state prevented him from consulting an 
attorney. Rather, he admits that he in fact sought and followed 
legal advice. 
Nor does Baum claim that he was unaware of the consequences of 
his failure to respond to Slingerland's complaint. Baum does not 
claim, for example, that he was so incapacitated that he could not 
read and understand the summons. The summons was "self-explanatory 
to anyone who can read." Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. 
Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963). It clearly stated 
that Baum was required to file an answer in writing within twenty 
days and that, "[i]f you fail to do so, judgment by default will be 
taken against you for the relief demanded in [the] Complaint." R. 
at 5. Cf. Bahr, 439 A.2d at 178 (where the defendant's illness did 
- 14 -
not prevent her from reading the papers served on her, her failure 
to respond was inexcusable). 
Baum does not claim that the attorney he consulted told him he 
did not have to answer the complaint. He only claims that the 
attorney told him that "liability is almost certain" (which it 
would be even if a jury were to apportion some fault to 
Slingerland), that Slingerland's claim would be dischargeable in 
bankruptcy and that Baum's "best option" would "probably" be to 
eventually file for bankruptcy.3 R. at 177 5 9. There is no 
evidence that Baum or the attorney he consulted could not have 
filed an answer or asked for an extension of time within the 
required time. Thus# the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding that Baum's alleged confusion did not justify setting 
aside the default judgment. 
Finally, any dispute between Baum and USF&G regarding coverage 
did not excuse Baum's default. Baum admits that USF&G told him 
that there was no coverage for the lawsuit even before it was 
3
 Baum does not claim that this advice was bad. But even if 
he did, that would not constitute mistake or excusable neglect. 
See, e.g., Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (any 
negligence on the part of the defendant's attorney was attributable 
to the defendant); Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 
429, 430 (Utah 1982) (the negligence of the defendants attorney 
may be imputed to him) . See also St. Joe Paper Co. v. Marc Box 
Co., 394 A.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (mere confusion 
or mistake or inadvertence of counsel, without more, is 
insufficient to set aside a default). 
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filed.4 He still had over three months to find an attorney and 
file an answer. Even if Baum's failure to respond to Slingerland's 
complaint was the result of USF&G's actions, USF&G's actions did 
not excuse Baum's neglect. See Goalia v. Bodnar, 749 P.2d 921, 929 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (the defendant's failure to take any action 
for two months after his insurer told him he would have to handle 
the case himself was inexcusable); Cyrus v. Haveson, 135 Cal. Rptr. 
246, 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (reliance on an insurer after 
defendants had notice that the insurer was not protecting their 
position in the litigation was inexcusable neglect). 
In short, Baum did not meet his burden of showing such a 
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect as would justify relief 
under rule 60(b)(1). At a minimum, the facts showed an 
indifference and lack of diligence on the part of all concerned, 
which are not grounds for vacating a default judgment. See Russell 
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). But in fact, the 
4
 Baum claims that he talked to Slingerland's lawyer and, as 
a result of those conversations, "I was of the understanding that 
he would try to work things out with the insurance company." R. at 
177 f 8. Obviously, Slingerland's attorney was not able to "work 
things out" with USF&G. That's why Slingerland had to file this 
action. In any event, Baum does not say that Slingerland's 
attorney ever told him that he did not have to respond to the 
complaint. Neither settlement discussions nor conversations with 
opposing counsel constitute mistake or excusable neglect where, as 
here, the defendant seeks independent counsel and counsel for the 
plaintiff does nothing to indicate that the defendant does not have 
to answer the complaint. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93-94 
(Utah 1986). Cf. Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 
617 (Utah 1975) (where defendant assumed the action had been taken 
care of and therefore took no steps to answer the complaint, his 
claim did not even approach "excusable neglect"). 
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circumstances showed more than mere indifference or lack of 
diligence; they clearly established an informed decision to let a 
default judgment be taken. 
The summons clearly stated and Baum clearly understood that a 
default judgment would be entered if he did not answer the 
complaint. Knowing thau there was no insurance coverage and 
perhaps recognizing his lack of experience in legal matters, he 
contacted an attorney, who advised him that liability was almost 
certain and that his best option would be to file for bankruptcy. 
After weighing all his alternatives, including the cost of 
defending the lawsuit now or discharging the judgment later through 
bankruptcy, he decided to let a default judgment be entered against 
him. Baum's decision not to appear and defend was thus an 
informed, reasoned, deliberate choice, which hardly constitutes 
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. See Board of Educ. of 
Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 
(1963) . See also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Yuil Int'l 
Trading Corp.. 105 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Brand v. NCC 
Corp.. 540 F. Supp. 562, 563-64 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
Perhaps most significant, the decision not to appear but to 
suffer a default judgment was not Baum's alone. After Baum's 
default had been entered but before any judgment was entered, Baum 
was notified of the date of the trial on damages and apparently 
notified not only his insurer but also his family's attorney, both 
of whom appeared at trial and were given an opportunity to 
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participate. Even then, it was not too late to have the default 
set aside and the matter heard on the merits. Yet Baum's insurer 
and attorney both chose to sit by and let a default judgment be 
entered. 
Baum may regret his decision to allow a default judgment to be 
entered against him, but bad judgment does not constitute "mistake, 
inadvertence, . . . or excusable neglect" under rule 60(b)(1). 
In fact, Baum has never claimed he made a bad decision. In 
moving to set aside the default judgment, he only claimed that "the 
situation [has] now changed." R. at 178 5 12. The only thing that 
has changed since this action was filed, however, is that USF&G has 
also sued Baum, for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to 
defend or indemnify Baum, and Baum has filed a counterclaim. See 
id. f 11. It was only after Baum counterclaimed against USF&G for 
bad faith in the declaratory judgment action that anyone bothered 
to try to have the default judgment set aside. Now that USF&G has 
apparently had second thoughts about its decision to deny Baum 
coverage, it has hired an attorney to try to overturn the default 
judgment. But "insurer's remorse" is not a recognized excuse for 
setting aside a default judgment under rule 60(b). USF&G may not 
be happy now with the decision to do nothing, but it had ample 
opportunity to intervene on Baum's behalf before the judgment was 
entered and deliberately chose not to. It had notice of the 
proceedings throughout and even appeared at trial and declined the 
court's offer to participate and cross-examine the witnesses. 
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Having made the choice to deny coverage and sit by while a default 
judgment was taken, USF&G cannot now go back and undo its decision 
under the guise of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect on 
the part of its insured. See Candelaria v. Avitia, 269 Cal. Rptr. 
32, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (an insurer was not entitled to relief 
from a default judgment against its insured where the insurer 
advised the plaintiff that it was denying coverage). Cf. Richas v. 
Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Ariz. 1982) (insurer's failure 
to establish excusable neglect is attributable to its insured). 
In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
deciding that, under the facts of this case, Baum failed to show a 
sufficient excuse to justify setting aside the default judgment 
under rule 60(b). The facts clearly established an informed 
decision to allow a default judgment to be taken, not "mistake, 
inadvertence . . . or excusable neglect." Rule 60(b) was not 
meant to relieve a litigant from strategic or tactical decisions 
which later prove to be improvident. Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. 
v. Harris. 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also 7 James W. 
Moore & Jo Desha Lucas, Moored Federal Practice f 60.22 [2] at 60-
182 (1992) ("a party who . . . makes an informed choice as to a 
particular course of action will not be relieved of the 
consequences when it subsequently develops that the choice was 
unfortunate"). "There must be an end to litigation someday, and 
free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from." 
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950). 
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II. 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
WAS UNTIMELY. 
Before Baum could obtain relief from the judgment, he had the 
burden of convincing the trial court not only that the judgment was 
entered against him through excusable neglect (or one of the other 
reasons specified in rule 60(b)), but also that his motion to set 
aside the judgment was timely. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 
1055-56 (Utah 1983). 
Baum's motion to set aside the default and default judgment 
was filed on September 11, 1992, more than three months after the 
default he asked to have set aside, which was entered on May 18, 
1992, and nearly three months after the default judgment, which was 
entered on June 17, 1992. Baum argues that his motion was timely 
because it was filed within three months of the default judgment. 
Rule 60(b), however, requires that a motion to set aside a 
judgment for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect be made 
"within a reasonable time and . . . not more than 3 months after 
the judgment . . . was entered or taken." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
(emphasis added). Utah courts have not yet addressed the issue, 
but courts construing the analogous federal rule have held that a 
motion for relief from judgment can still be untimely even if it is 
filed within the outside time limit specified in the rule if, under 
the circumstances, it was not filed within a reasonable time. See. 
e.g., Simon v. Pay Tel Management, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1219, 1228 
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(N.D. 111. 1991) , aff'd, 952 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1992) (table); 
Cavalier Label Co. v. S.S. Lilika. 71 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976).5 Thus, the fact that Baum's motion was filed barely within 
three months after the default judgment was entered does not 
necessarily make that motion timely. As the delay in making the 
motion approaches the outer limits of the allowable time, the 
burden on the defendant to show that the delay was reasonable 
increases. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale 
Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1979). 
Admittedly, Slingerland did not argue in the trial court that 
Baum's motion was untimely because it was not filed within a 
reasonable time after the default judgment.6 However, this court 
can affirm the district court on any proper ground. See, e.g. , 
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.f 808 P.2d 1069, 1078 n.20 
(Utah 1991); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988) . Where the trial court does not specify the basis for 
its denial of a motion to set aside a final order or judgment, the 
appellate court can sustain its action if it appears from the 
record that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time. 
5
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is substantially similar 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This court can therefore 
look to federal courts' interpretation of the federal rule when 
construing the Utah rule. See Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1984). 
6
 Slingerland challenged the timeliness of Baum's motion only 
as it related to the default certificate. R. at 191. 
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Young v. Western Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1984). 
Moreover, even if Slingerland were precluded from arguing that 
Baum's motion was barred solely because it was untimely, the trial 
court could properly consider Baum's promptness or dilatoriness in 
bringing the motion when it exercised its discretion to deny the 
motion. See, e.g.f American Metals Serv. Export Co. v. Ahrens 
Aircraft, Inc. , 666 F.2d 718, 720 (1st Cir. 1981) . See also Young, 
680 P.2d at 395 (the trial court acted well within its discretion 
in denying a motion in view of the laches of the movant). 
In deciding whether a rule 60(b) motion was brought within a 
reasonable time, courts have considered the interest in finality, 
the reason for the delay, the litigant's practical ability to learn 
earlier of the grounds he relied on and the prejudice to the 
opposing party. See., e.g. , Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
Here, Baum knew of his potential liability and contacted his 
insurance company before any action was even filed. He was served 
with process on February 11, 1992. His time to answer the 
complaint expired on March 2, 1992. He had another two and a half 
months before Slingerland even sought a default certificate. 
Another month passed before the trial on damages. Baum clearly had 
notice of the trial. In fact, two attorneys appeared at the trial 
—one on behalf of Baum and his father and one on behalf of the 
family's insurer. They chose not to participate in the trial, and 
a default judgment was entered. Baum then waited nearly three 
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months to file a motion to set aside that judgment—well after the 
time for appealing from the judgment had expired. In fact, it was 
only after the Baums had counterclaimed against USF&G for bad faith 
that USF&G retained counsel to bring a motion on Baum,s behalf. 
Also, the prejudice to Slingerland if the judgment were set aside 
was apparent. See infra pt. IV. 
All of these facts and circumstances were before the trial 
court. The trial court could reasonably conclude from these facts 
that Baum's motion was untimely. In any event, this court cannot 
say that, in light of all the facts, the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment. 
III. 
BAUM DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
The third element which Baum had to meet to prevail on his 
rule 60(b) (1) motion was to show that he had a meritorious defense 
to Slingerland's claims. See State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 
1055-56 (Utah 1983). 
Baum claims that the merits of the case are not an issue on a 
motion to set aside a default judgment. Appellant's Brief at 10. 
Slingerland agrees that the trial court did not have to consider 
whether or not Baum had a meritorious defense, not because Baum did 
not have to show a meritorious defense, but because Baum did not 
meet his threshold burden of showing excusable neglect or some 
other reason justifying relief from the default judgment. The 
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existence of a meritorious defense, standing alone, does not excuse 
the defendant's failure to abide by the rules of procedure. See, 
e.g., Simon v. Pay Tel Management, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 
(N.D. 111. 1991), aff'd. 952 F. Supp. 1398 (7th Cir. 1992) (table). 
It is clear that, under Utah law, the issue of a meritorious 
defense does not even arise until the movant first establishes a 
sufficient excuse for allowing a default judgment to be entered 
against him. In Board of Education of Granite School District v. 
Cox, one of the cases Baum relies on,7 the court stated: 
Appellant . . . has set forth defenses which apply 
to the merits of the case and have no application as to 
why appellant did not answer within the time allotted. 
We are concerned only with why he did not answer, not 
with what kind of answer would he give if he were so 
inclined. This latter question arises only after 
consideration of the first question and a sufficient 
excuse therefrom being shown. 
14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963) (emphasis added). Where, 
as here, the movant fails to establish excusable neglect or some 
other recognized excuse for a default judgment, neither the trial 
court nor this court has to reach the issue of meritorious defense. 
See Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056 ("it is unnecessary, and moreover 
inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses 
unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been 
7
 In Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the other 
case Baum relies on, the court said, "Usually, it is not 
appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to examine the merits of the 
claim decided by the default judgment." 684 P.2d at 55 (emphasis 
added). In other words, it was Slingerland, not Baum, who did not 
have to establish the merits of his claim. 
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Parkland Dev. Corp,, 550 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (App. Div. 1990) (where 
the only affidavit addressing the liability issue did no more than 
imply that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory 
negligence, it was reasonable to conclude that the defendant's only 
defense was an "uncompelling one"). Relying on Slingerland's 
testimony at the damages trial, however, Baum argues that 
Slingerland's comparative fault in agreeing to return home without 
sleep, in going to sleep on the way home, in taking off his seat 
belt and in yelling at Baum when he started to go off the road 
constitutes a meritorious defense. 
Although Slingerland testified that he and Baum had been at 
Wendover most of the night and decided to drive home after they 
started getting tired, Slingerland also testified that they stopped 
on their way home so that Baum could get a Coke, and Slingerland 
asked Baum "if he'd be okay." R. at 256. Apparently, Baum said he 
would, and Slingerland thought Baum would be all right because "he 
had been working graveyards at Blockbuster like the past four 
months before this." Id. It was only then that Slingerland took 
off his seat belt and went to sleep. 
Slingerland's failure to use his seat belt did not constitute 
a meritorious defense, and evidence of that failure was 
inadmissible on the issues of both liability and damages. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (1988). 
Moreover, even if Slingerland were comparatively negligent in 
agreeing to go home when he and Baum were tired, it is highly 
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USF&G and the Baums attended the damage trial. At the beginning of 
the trial, the court invited the attorneys' participation: "If 
either of you had any interest in respect to your respective 
clients in terms of examining or questioning any of the evidence 
that might be presented before the court I would like to hear that. 
. . . [I]f there were to be information that could help me evaluate 
this better it would be appreciated." R. at 238. Before closing, 
the court again invited counsel to cross-examine any of the 
witnesses or make any other comments. Id. at 3 07. Counsel for 
Baum and his insurer declined all of the court's invitations to 
participate and "examine the evidence." 
If Dr. Randle's testimony was "brief," it was only because he 
had prepared a thorough report setting out the plaintiff's damages, 
which the court had reviewed before trial. See id. at 245. Thus, 
there was no need for Dr. Randle to testify at length. Moreover, 
Judge Young did not accept Dr. Randle's figures uncritically. In 
fact, he criticized them as being perhaps too conservative, jld. at 
3 08, and actually increased Dr. Randle's figures for the present 
value of future income loss by 20 percent, id. at 309. 
In short, Baum did not meet his burden of showing a 
meritorious defense. In any event, he had every opportunity to 
present his defense to the court earlier but deliberately chose not 
to. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to set aside the default judgment. See Simon, 782 F. 
Supp. at 1230. 
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prejudice is simply one factor the trial court can consider in the 
exercise of its sound discretion to grant or deny relief. See 
Maine Nat'l Bank v. F/V Cecily B (O.N. 677261), 116 F.R.D. 66, 69 
(D. Me. 1987). But the burden was on Baum to show that granting 
relief from the judgment would not prejudice Slingerland. See 
Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp. v. Virginia Chain Distribs., Inc.f 97 
F.R.D. 17, 19 (W.D. Pa. 1982). 
Baum's moving papers did not make out a prima facie case 
entitling him to relief from the judgment. See R. at 169-79; see 
also supra pts. I-III. Nor did he meet his burden of showing that 
Slingerland would not be prejudiced if the judgment were set aside. 
See id. Therefore, Slingerland did not have to address the issue 
of prejudice in his memorandum, and the court did not err in not 
reaching the issue. 
Although the trial court did not expressly address the issue 
of prejudice—and this court need not reach the issue—the 
prejudice to Slingerland is readily apparent from the record, and 
this court can affirm the trial court7s decision on any proper 
ground. See, e.g. . Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs. . 752 P.2d 892, 
895 (Utah 1988). 
In addition to the usual prejudice resulting from delay, such 
as faded memories and stale evidence, Slingerland would be 
prejudiced by an order setting aside the default judgment in this 
case for at least three reasons. First, setting aside the judgment 
would delay Slingerland's recovery and thus cause him further 
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CONCLUSION 
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plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the judgment were set aside. 
Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default and 
default judgment. The judgment of the trial court should therefore 
be affirmed. 
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(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
